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IN 
The Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
CLARABELL !(ELLEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAK:E TRA~SPORTATION 
COMPANY, a corporation; 
GREEN CAB TRANSPORTA-
TION CO:JIP ANY, a corpora-
tion; and LEWIS BARTLEY, 
Defendants and AppellantE·. 
Case No. 6329 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFEND .. Z\.NTS AND 
APPELLANTS 
No dispute exists as to the facts involved, nor with 
respect to the questions presented for determination. 
The difference of vievv has reference solely to the law 
applicable to the particular circumstances of this case. 
I. The Question of Negligence 
The first question considered by both appellants and 
respondent is the sufficiency of the evidence on the quPs-
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2 
tion of negligence to make a case for the jury, or to sus-
tain the verdict of the jury. 
Respondent contends (Brief, page 5) tha:t there was 
a conflict in the evidence on the question of speed which 
made that a fact to be determined by the jury. Respond-
ent alleged in her complaint, as ·an act of negligence on 
the part of appellants, that the cab in which she was rid-
ing was traveling at a rate of speed in excess of 35 miles 
per hour at the time the brakes were applied and the 
cab brought to a stop. She testified (Tr. 48, Ab. 14) 
that the cab was going about 25 or 30 miles per hour; 
that {Tr. 56, Ab. 16) she had never driven a car; that 
the car which dashed up in front of the cab was go-
ing faster than the cab. The witness Bartley testified 
that the cab was going from 20 to 22 miles an hour (Tr. 
102, Ab. 27). It is true the witnesses differ as to how 
fast the cab was going, but this is of no consequence and 
presents no proper issue of fact to be determined by the 
jury. There is no state law, and no city ordinance 
is pleaded, nor are any facts pleaded, which make a speed 
of 25 miles per hour a negligent or careless speed at the 
time and place in question. 
There is no evidence from which even a presump-
tion can be drawn that the speed involved was negligent, 
or caused the damage complained of, unless we draw 
that presumption from the sole fact that the plain-
tiff fell off the seat, and this is in fact the presump-
tion which respondent relies upon, (See Brief, page 
6). We think it is beyond dispute that the fact of the hap-
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pening of the accident is no proof of negligence, nor even 
the basis of a presumption in this case, because (a) the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not pleaded Loos v. 
Jlountain Fu.el Supply Company, ) ........ Utah ______ , 108 Pac. 
(2d) :254, at page 259); and (b) because even if it had 
been pleaded, it would not be applicable in a case where 
the other facilities involved, such as an approaching car, 
were not under the control of the defendant, (Yellow Cab 
Company v. Hodson, et al (Colo.), 14 Pac. (2d) 1081). 
Respondent further contends that the jury had a 
right to indulge in a presumption, from the facts sur-
rounding the incident, that the driver 'vas not keeping a 
proper or any lookout (Brief, page 5). This is another 
effort to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which, 
for the reasons shown, may not be done in this case. 
However, even if the jury were permitted to draw 
from the fact that the accident occurred, an inference 
or presumption that the driver was not keeping a proper 
or any lookout, r.ny such inference or presumption would 
immediately disappear in the face of positive and undis-
puted evidence that a careful ·watch and lookout war, kept. 
See the evidence of Bartley (Tr. 101, Ab. 26) that he 
looked both right and left; that two cars had proceeded 
through the intersection immediately in front of him, 
and that the car approaching from the left did not show 
up until there was nothing to do but apply his brakes and 
stop to avoid a collision. A presumption is not evidence, 
and has no weight as such, but only determines the 
party who has the duty of going fonYard with the evi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
dence, and when that duty is met by the production of 
evidence, the presumption becomes inoperative. Annota-
tion :95 A. L. R. 881. Professor Wigmore in his work on 
Evidence, 2nd Ed. Sec. 2491, says : 
"It is, therefore, a fallacy to attribute (as 
do some judges) an artificial probative force to a 
presumption, increasing for the jury the weight of 
the facts, even when the opponent has come for-
ward with some evidence to the contrary." 
Our Court has followed this view, State v. Gre.en, 
78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2) 177, and in Buckley v. Francis, 
78 Utah 606, 6 Pac. (2d) 188, and in other cases. It has 
been stated that a presumption is ''a mere house of cards, 
which one moment stands with sufficient force to deter-
mine an issue, but at the next by reason of the slightest 
rebutting evidence, topples utterly out of consideration 
of the tryer of facts," Jones on Evidence, 2nd Edition, 
Sec. 32. 
In this case, therefore, where the rebutting evidence 
of keeping a proper lookout (Tr. 101, Ab. 26) and re-
tarding the speed of the cab as it entered the intersec-
tion (Tr. 101, Ab. 2·6) is complete and undisputed, there 
can be no recourse to presumptions or inferences, nor can 
there be any left-handed application of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur, in view of the repeated decisions of our 
court on that point. 
The cases cited by respondent under this point, on 
pages 2 and 3 of her brief, state general rules of law 
applicable to proper facts and particularly applicable to 
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the facts in those cases which were entirely different and 
bear no analogy to the facts presented here. 
ll. The Release 
Appellants, by their opening brief (pp. 19-22), have 
raised the question as to "~hether or not respondent has, 
by her Reply, pleaded facts sufficient to avoid the releas·e 
set up in appellants' ·answer. This point was preserved 
by motions for non-suit and directed verdict, and by ap-
propriate assignments of error. Respondent's brief 
makes no reference to this aspect of the case. 
This plea attempting to avoid the release for fraud 
lacks such essential elements as (a) that the represen-
tations were false; (b) tha:t they were known to be false 
by the person making them or that they were made with 
the intention that they should be acted upon by plain-
tiff. 
The authorities (appellants' opening brief, (pp. 19-
22) appear to hold that a plea in avoidance of a release 
for fraud must contain all the essential elements of a 
cause of action for false representation. Indeed, the 
case of Bennett, et ux. v. Deaton (Idaho), 68 Pac. (2d) 
895, principally relied upon by the respondent, confirms 
this view of the law. In that case as sho·wn at page 899 
of the report referred to, and at page 13 of respondent's 
brief, the Court citing with approval the holding in 
lf!oods v. Wikstrom (Ore.), 135 P.192, said: 
" 'If the defendant represented to the plain-
tiff, in order to prevail on him to execute the re-
lease, that the accident was unavoidable, and that 
he had no cause of action against him, w :tlwut 
beliering said representation to be true, and the 
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plaintiff believed said representations, and, so be-
lieving, executed the release, such representations 
constituted fraud and vitiated said release, if the 
representations were false.' ... " (Italics ours.) 
At several points in respondent's brief it is stated 
that the consideration paid for the release was inade-
quate. The statements of fact made on this point are 
not, in every instance, complete nor accurate. See re-
spondent's brief, page 11, where it is said, "particularly 
is this true when the amount paid in exchange for the 
release is so inadequate, as the evidence shows in this 
case that the $20.00 would not pay the expenseR in-
curred for independent medical services and for hired 
help.'' At other places in respondent's brief, the true 
facts are shown which are these: that in exchange for 
the release, respondent was to receive not only the sum 
of $20.00 to pay the expense of household help, but, also 
appellants were to pay all bills theretofore incurred by 
respondent for medical service, and to pay for such ad-
ditional medical attention as she might require. See the 
testimony of :Mr. Boynton (Tr. 119, Ab. 30): 
" . I told her that we would pay all 
doctor bills that she had so far incurred, her doc-
tor and the one that we had advised, and that we 
would further pay doctor bills as long as she was 
under the treatment of Dr. Spencer \Vright if 
she would go to him and take treatments until he 
released her. . . . ' ' 
and see again (Tr. 129, Ab. 32): 
"The proposition . . . in consideration 
of which the release was signed v,·as not only the 
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$20.000 but the payment of all past doctor bills 
and futurf' medical serYice.'' 
There is no rlaim in the pleadings of inadequacy 
of consideration, nor any claim of duress or undue in-
fluence, nor was there any such factor in truth involved. 
The record does not indicate that plaintiff's net recovery 
from the a,,-ard made her by the jury would exceed the 
amount of past and future doctor bills, and the cash 
payment made her by appellants. In view of the issues 
framed by the pleadings, respondent's present sugges-
tion of inadequacy of consideration is inappropriate. 
In connection with the argument just referred to, 
respondent cites Dovich v. Chief Consolidated Mining 
Co., 53 Utah 522, at page 535, where the Court says: 
"Settlements of damage cases between em-
ployers and employees are to be encouraged, but 
disingenuousness and unfairness on the part of 
either are reprehensible." (Italics ours.) 
A mere reading of the excerpt cited by respondent 
shows that the rule there laid down has no relevancy to 
the case at bar where no employer-employee relationship 
is involved and upon reading that case in full, \Ve dis-
cover that Dovich was induced to sign a release without 
knowing that he was doing so, and upon the belief that 
he was signing a paper to get his insurance. On the con-
trary, in the case at bar, the respondent knew what she 
was signing, knew what she was to receive, and had in-
dependent advice. 
There is one other point raised by rrspondent 's brief 
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under this caption which requires consideration. The 
principal misrepresentation complained of is that agents 
of the defendants stated to the plaintiff that she would 
not be able to recover against the defendants for her 
injuries. Mrs. Kelley's evidence (Tr. 52-65, Ab. 16-18) 
was that Mr. Boynton told her that it didn't matter 
whether she employed an attorney or not, that she 
could not get more than they were offering her. Mr. 
Boynton testified (Tr. 126, Ab. 31) that he told Mrs. 
Kelly the defendants did not consider themselves liable 
for anything; that he told her in the presence of her 
hrother, Mr. Utley, that what they were offering ·was 
all they were vdlling to pay. Do these statements 
amount to misrepres-entations sufficient to avoid a re-
lease executed ten days after the accident happened, un-
der circumstances where plaintiff's brother had invited 
defendants out to make an adjustment, and the adjust-
ment was made with respondent on the independent ad-
vice of her brother, and after due deliveration ~ If so, 
then the rule that releases and adjustments are to he 
encouraged, must be reversed. 
Respondent endeavors, in her brief, to fasten upon 
the point that Mr. Boynton and :Mr. Jennings, who came 
out to s·ee her, ·were expert adjustors, skilled in the law 
of liability for personal injuries, and that they took ad-
vantage of her. There is no proof of any such claim in 
the record and certainly none for the statement made 
at the top of page 11 of respondent's brief that these in-
dividuals had adjusted many cases arising out of injur-
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ies to patrons of taxicab companies, and that they were in 
the category of experts, such as claim agents and claim 
adjustors. 
nir. Boynton testified (Tr. 123, Ab. 31) that he took 
::\Ir. Jennings out with him so that Mr. Jennings would 
be present at the conversation; that Mr. Utley, plaintiff's 
brother, had called that day and said that they were 
ready to talk final settlement; that defendants were 
interested in making a settlement to save legal expense. 
\V e have re-checked the record in an effort to find any 
evidence supporting the contention that Mr. Boynton and 
Mr. Jennings were expert adjustors, or represented them-
selves to be such, or that they had or claimed to have 
any knowledge of the law applicable to the facts, and 
we can find none. \V e respectfully submit that there is 
neither a sufficient pleading, nor any evidence in the 
record, adequate to avoid the effect of the release shown. 
m. Instructions 
Respondent makes no serious effort to justify the 
refusal of the Court to give defendants' requested In-
struction No. 6 This request was as follows, (Tr. lAO, 
Ab. 42): 
''The defendants request the Court to instruct 
the jury that if the jury finds that the defendants 
did in fact state to the plaintiff that they were 
not liable, and she could not recover, then the 
jury should further determine whether such ex-
pression of opinion was honestly entertained and 
honestly made, and if the jury finds that such ex-
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pressions of opinion were made and were honestly 
entertained, then the Court instructs the jury that 
the expression of such opinion would not consti-
tute misrepresentation, and that the release could 
not be avoided on that ground." 
At page 20 of her brief, respondent says, in effect, 
that the Court's refusal to give defendants' requested 
Instruction No. 6 was justified by the same reason which 
justified the refusal to give request No. 5. A mere read-
ing of the pleadings and the two instructions will show 
that they have no relation to each other. Requested In-
struction No. 6 was asked upon the theory that a repre-
sentation honestly entertained and honestly, even though 
mistakenly, made cannot be such a false representation 
of as will avoid a contract. It would seem that this view 
is incontestable. vVe refer the Court again to the cases 
cited in our opening brief at page 36, and add thereto the 
citation from Bennett, et ux v. Deaton, et al, 68 Pac. (2d) 
895, as set out at page 13 of respondent's brief, which 
reads as follows: 
" 'If the defendant represented to the plain-
tiff, in order to prevail on him to execute the re-
lease, that the accident was unavoidable, and that 
he had no cause of action against him, without 
believing said representations to be true, and the 
plaintiff believed said representations, and, so be-
lieving, executed the release, such representations 
constituted fraud and vitiated said release, if the 
representations were false.' '' (Italics ours.) 
There is no evidence that the statements made in 
this case were made either carelessly or negligently, or 
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without belief in their truth. The contrary clearly 
appears. In any event, if the ease was to have been 
submitted to the jury at all, appellants were entitled to 
an instruction upon this vital point. 
As to the remainder of the objections to instruc-
tions given and requests refused, the appellants rest 
their case upon the arguments set forth in their principal 
brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS, 
and CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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